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BOGGS v. BAIR
892 F.2d 1193 (4th Cir. 1989)
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Note: Direct page citations for the Fourth Circuit's opinion are to Westlaw, 1989 WL 149746.
FACTS
In 1984, Richard T. Boggs was a suspect in the murder of an
elderly black woman named Treeby Shaw. Approximately three
weeks after the murder, Boggs was arrested on unrelated charges.
Initially he denied involvement in the murder, but after the police
discovered evidence linking him to the crime, he waived his Miranda
rights and confessed to the murder and robbery of Ms. Shaw.
Boggs was convicted of both robbery and capital murder. The
jury sentenced him to life imprisonment for the robbery and found
that the murder involved an "aggravated battery" as set out in Va.
Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1983 Repl. Vol.) and sentenced him to
death. Boggs appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia which
affirmed both his conviction and sentence. Boggs v. Commonwealth,
229 Va. 501, 331 S.E.2d 407 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031
(1986).
On petition for a wrii of habeas corpus, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted relief only
with respect to the sentencing phase of Boggs' trial. Finding that the
claim was properly preserved, the district court granted relief based
on the fact that the judge refused defense counsel's request to redact
racial comments present in Boggs' confession prior to allowing the
prosecutor to read it to the jury. Boggs v. Bair, 695 F. Supp. 864,
869-70 (E.D. Va. 1988). The Court found that the prosecution's
reading of the unredacted confession containing comments such as, "I
want to kill the enemy on the other side, which is me, the white all
over the world. I want to kill niggers," violated Boggs' Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. Further, the district court noted
that although both Boggs and the victim were white, some members
of the jury were black. Id. The District Court stated that "[The fact
that the jury had a moral judgment to make about the culpability of
Boggs' act does not mean they had a right to consider other elements
of his character that have no bearing on this particular act of murder."
Id. at 870; see, summary of South Carolina v. Gathers, 2 Capital
Defense Digest 5 (Nov. 1989) (noting that "for purposes of imposing
the death penalty ... the defendant's punishment must be tailored to
his personal responsibility and moral guilt." South Carolina v.
Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2210 (1989).
Both Boggs and the State appealed. In an opinion by Judge
Widener, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed Boggs' conviction and reversed the district court's grant of
relief with respect to the sentencing phase, thereby affinning the
sentence of death.
HOLDING
Boggs asserted numerous grounds for relief, but the holdings
of the Fourth Circuit which merit discussion in this summary because
of potential significance to practitioners are the following: (1) that the
proper factors to review in determining whether an aggravated
battery has occurred sufficient to fulfill the vileness predicate of the
capital sentencing statute (Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2) may include
"the number OR nature of the batteries inflicted upon the victim."
Boggs v. Bair, Westlaw at 19 (4th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added); (2)
that a trial judge is not constitutionally required to attempt to
rehabilitate potential jurors during voir dire prior to disqualifying
them for cause. Id. at 29; and (3) that Boggs did not suffer prejudicial
error when the prosecution read racist statements contained in his
confession to the jury during the closing arguments of the sentencing
ANALYSIS
(1) AGGRAVATED BATTERY
In Boggs, the court reviewed the defendant's claim that
Virginia's capital sentencing statute, specifically the vileness
predicate, was unconstitutional as applied to the circumstances of his
case. Under Virginia's statutory scheme, a death sentence may be
imposed if at the sentencing phase the jury finds that the defendant's
conduct in committing the murder was "outrageously or wantonly
vile.. .in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated
battery to the victim." Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2. The vileness
predicate can be found if the murder involved any of these three
varying factors. Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 424, 442, 304
S.E.2d 271,282 (1983). The United States Supreme Court has held
that in order to avoid arbitrary imposition of the death penalty in
administration of the vileness predicate, the jury must be instructed in
such a way as to limit and guide its discretion. Boggs, at 17 (citing
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)). Further, the United States
Supreme Court has held that the language in the statute
"[O]utrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" will not
itself suffice to limit the jury's discretion and that application of some
"narrowing construction" is required. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420,428, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 1764-65, 64 L. Ed. 2d 398,406-07 (1980);
see, Falkner, The Constitutional Deficiencies of Virginia's "Vile-
ness" Aggravating Factor, 2 Capital Defense Digest 19 (Nov. 1989).
Prior to the holding in this case, the definition and narrowing
construction available to guide the jury's discretion was to inform
jurors that aggravated battery is that "[wihich, qualitatively AND
quantitatively, is more culpable than the minimum necessary to
accomplish the act of murder." Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va.
455, 478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978) (emphasis added). In the
instant case, Boggs argued that the trial court's instruction defining
aggravated battery for purposes of imposing the death penalty lacked
the necessary limitations. Boggs, at 17. The trial court instructed the
jury that it "could impose a sentence of death if they found the
murder 'wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman' in that it involved an
aggravated battery 'beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish the
act of murder."' Id. at 18. The Fourth Circuit held that the difference
in wording was not of constitutional magnitude, and agreed with the
Supreme Court of Virginia that the proper test to determine an
aggravated battery involved reviewing "[t]he number OR nature of
the batteries inflicted upon the victim." Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
Consequently the Fourth Circuit, by affirming the trial court,
may have effectively broadened the definition of aggravated battery
by allowing the jury to classify a particular incident as aggravated,
merely by finding that the "QUANTITY" of wounds or blows was
excessive without also considering the "QUALITY" (nature) of the
attack. The issue is whether quantity alone indicates a level of moral
culpability greater than that found in the commission of the offense
itself. A finding of greater moral culpability is necessary before a jury
can impose the death sentence. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 305, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961-62 (1976). The
United States Supreme Court has held that the only factors which
may be considered are those which permit a jury rationally to
separate defendants based on their own personal moral culpability.
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496,502-04, 107 5. Ct. 2529,2532-33,
96 L. Ed. 2d 440, 448-9 (1987); see also, South Carolina v. Gathers,
109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989). For example, in Gathers the Court held
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draw inferences about positive characteristics of the victim from
items he had in his possession at the time of his death. Gathers, at
2211.
Previous Virginia cases have indicated that quantity alone may
be insufficient to establish a particular battery as "aggravated."
Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130, 360 S.E.2d 196 (1987)
(noting that when multiple gun shots are the cause of death, proper
classification as an aggravated battery would require that the victim
survived the first shot, and that an appreciable time passed between
the first and final shot causing death). The fact that the nature of the
attack must be considered is also evidenced by a holding that the
vileness factor was met when the "[w]ound was inflicted in a savage
and methodical manner." Stout v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 126, 376
S.E.2d 288 (1989) (single and deep slash in the victim's throat caused
a slow painful death). The evidence in Boggs may not be seen as the
best for presenting the distinction between the culpability of a
defendant and the method employed in the murder. Boggs not only
inflicted many blows to the victim, but also switched weapons during
the attack. In fact, his principal argument that the attack was not both
quantitatively AND qualitatively sufficient to establish aggravated
battery centered on his contention that he was simply unsuccessful in
trying to find the quickest way of killing the victim. Boggs, at 19.
Practitioners should continue to object to both the Virginia
model jury instructions, which contain no narrowing construction of
the statutory terms, and to either the Smith or Boggs narrowing
construction of aggravated battery.
(2) VOIR DIRE
Boggs also claimed that the trial court erred when the judge
failed personally to question and attempt to rehabilitate potential
jurors who indicated that they would under no circumstances vote for
the death sentence. Id. at 28. In holding that the trial court did not err
and dismissing Boggs' claim as being without merit, the Fourth
Circuit stated that not only was it proper to exclude jurors who could
not follow judicial instructions due to their own moral views, but also
that a judge has no constitutional duty to rehabilitate apparently
disqualified veniremen. Id. It should be noted that although the trial
judge did not attempt to rehabilitate through personal questioning
those jurors indicating an aversion to the death penalty, he did, as is
all too common, question and rehabilitate one juror who originally
indicated that she felt death was ordinarily the proper punishment for
murder. Boggs, 695 F. Supp. at 874.
It is clear from this holding that defense counsel must assume
responsibility for further questioning of jurors with reservations about
the death penalty. Practitioners should elicit agreement that the juror
could follow the instructions of the court and consider the death
penalty. If possible, this agreement should be elicited, repeated,
reinforced and emphasized on the record. Further, any defense
objection to the disqualification of a potential juror for cause should
be placed on the record. Also, objections to refusal to excuse an
unqualified pro-death juror should be renewed at the time the jury is
impaneled. See, summary of Hoke v. Commonwealth, 2 Capital
Defense Digest 18 (Nov. 1989).
(3) PREJUDICIAL STATEMENTS IN STATE'S CLOSING
ARGUMENTS
In reversing the district court's holding, the Fourth Circuit held
that the Judge's decision NOT to require redaction of racial state-
ments contained in Boggs' confession before allowing the prosecutor
to read the confession to the jury was proper, and did not prejudice
the defendant during either the guilt or sentencing phases of his trial.
Id. at 36. The rationale of the district court was that although the error
was harmless during the guilt phase due to the overwhelming
evidence against the defendant, the racial comments were improper
and highly prejudicial during the sentencing phase. Boggs, 695 F.
Supp. at 870.
The district court stated that "Boggs' racial views have no
bearing on the culpability of this particular act." Id. However, the
Fourth Circuit dismissed this claim, observing that the comments
amounted to only a few lines from a multi-page closing argument and
that the Commonwealth's Attorney "defused the racial character of
Boggs' language" by explaining that the comments indicated a threat
to persons of any race. Boggs, at 35.
It should be noted that although Boggs ultimately lost this
claim on the merits, the district court explicitly, and the Fourth
Circuit implicitly, found over the Commonwealth's objection that the
claim was properly made and preserved on federal grounds and was
not procedurally defaulted. Boggs, 695 F. Supp. at 869. Virginia
practitioners should note that, especially during the sentencing phase,
ANY evidence not relevant to defendant's individual moral culpabil-
ity should be objected to on federal grounds and preserved on the
record. This includes such evidence that is included in the defen-
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FACTS
Roger Keith Coleman was arrested and charged with the rape
and capital murder of Wanda Faye Thompson McCoy. After being
convicted on both charges and sentenced to death, Coleman appealed
to the Supreme Court of Virginia. Upon review, the Court affirmed
both his conviction and sentence. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226
Va. 31, 307 S.E.2d 864 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1109 (1984).
Coleman applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the state
Circuit Court, which denied the writ after an evidentiary hearing.
After 31 days, Coleman filed an appeal of the order denying the writ
with the Supreme Court of Virginia. He also filed a motion with the
state habeas court to "correct" the date of its final judgment. The state
habeas court denied the motion to change the date of final judgment,
and on the state's motion, the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed
Coleman's appeal as untimely. Again, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari. Coleman v. Bass, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
Asserting 11 claims of error, Coleman applied for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court. Without conducting
an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied habeas relief and
dismissed seven of the claims as procedurally barred. Coleman then
initiated this appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
